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The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Correcting Discrimination of Persons
with Mental Disabilities in the Arrest,
Post-Arrest, and Pretrial Processes
Jennifer Fischer*
Introduction
Stories of the problems faced by persons with mental illness
in the criminal justice system range from tragic to frustrating. For
example, Chuck, with a history of drug abuse and physical and
mental health problems, died in jail after the police arrested him
for possession of a controlled substance.1 Controlled substance
possession is a common reason for the arrest of persons with
mental illness, but certainly not one that should lead to death. 2
After the police gave Chuck the incorrect medications, he had an
adverse reaction.3  Instead of providing medical treatment,
however, the police strapped him to a chair. 4 Making it worse, the
police lied to his mother about his whereabouts and did not let her
see him until he was dying in the hospital.5 He died, not because
of outright cruel treatment, but because of neglect. 6
Risdon Slate is an Associate Professor of Criminology at
Florida Southern College.7 Despite his doctorate and extensive
knowledge of the criminal justice system, when he was brought to
* J.D. expected 2005, University of Minnesota Law School. My sincerest thanks
go to Professor Michael Perlin for his guidance and support in writing this article.
1. LAURA LEE HALL ET AL., NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, TRIAD
REPORT, SHATTERED LIVES: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL SURVEY OF NAMI MEMBERS
LIVING WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES AND THEIR FAMILIES (2003) [hereinafter TRIAD
REPORT], at www.nami.org/content/Navigationmenu/Inform-yourself/About
PublicPolicy/PolicyResearchInstitute/Triad/NAMI_TRIADReport FINAL.pdf.
2. See infra Part I.B. 1.




7. The Impact of the Mentally Ill on the Criminal Justice System: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 63
(2000) (statement of Risdon Slate, Associate Professor of Criminology, Florida
Southern College).
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jail after exhibiting bizarre behavior during a manic episode, the
police ignored his wife's advice about his medication.8 During his
stay in jail he never saw medical personnel or received medical
treatment, another prisoner assaulted him, and the police placed
him in an isolation cell to punish him for behaviors brought on by
his illness.9 He was released only after a probation officer with
whom he had previously worked intervened on his behalf.'0 If
these kinds of experiences can happen to someone with a loving,
caring family and an extensive background in the criminal justice
system, they can happen to anyone with a mental illness.
Unfortunately, the more typical story involves someone like
James who has no support systems." James grew up in Brooklyn
in a middle class family and was studying engineering when he
was first hospitalized for paranoid schizophrenia. 12 Years of
moving in and out of hospitals, the death of his parents, and lost
contact with siblings left James homeless-sleeping in a park,
eating out of garbage cans, and drinking malt liquor to deal with
the voices he heard. 13  James had no psychiatrist and no
insurance. 14 One day, while arguing loudly with voices in his head
and swinging his arms on a street corner, he was arrested for
accidentally hitting a police officer. 15 Thirty hours later he met his
lawyer who recognized that James probably had a mental illness.16
Based on this recognition, the lawyer had the choice of asking the
judge for a psychiatric examination, resulting in weeks in jail
waiting for the results, or pleading guilty to a lesser charge and
being released immediately.17 The prosecutor and the defense
lawyer agreed on a lower charge and James received community
service.'i Once James was on his own, however, he was back on
the street with no place to sleep, no benefits, and no idea of where
to turn for help.19 When he was picked up later for trespassing,
8. Id. at 64.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. HEATHER BARR, URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, PRISONS AND JAILS: HOSPITALS OF
LAST RESORT 1 (1999), available at http://www.prisonsucks.com/scans/






16. Id. at 1-2.





the judge wanted to send him to jail for failing to do his
community service, 20 thus starting the cycle too common for
persons with mental illness-arrested and released, only to be
arrested again.
These stories are all too common and reflect the difficulties
that many people with a mental illness face in society today.21 Not
only were these people arrested as a result of manifestations of
their mental illness, but also when the police were made aware of
their disabilities, the police made few efforts to properly respond
and help them by providing proper medical treatment.22
Substance abuse and homelessness are common among persons
with a mental illness and increase their risk of exposure to the
criminal justice system. 23
These failures to properly address the problems of mental
illness have led to jails and prisons in the United States becoming
de facto mental hospitals. The Department of Justice estimates
that at least 7% of all jail inmates and 16% of all prison inmates
have a mental condition or have had an overnight stay in a
hospital.24 While there is no consensus on the reasons for these
numbers, hundreds of thousands of individuals with a mental
illness have been incorrectly labeled as criminals based on
manifestations of their illnesses. 25
Many in the mental disability rights community believed that
help had arrived in the form of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),26 signed into law by President George Bush, Sr., on July
26, 1990.27 Disability activists and politicians lauded it as
bringing freedom to those with disabilities. 28 Yet many persons
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Kate Stanley, Instead of Psychiatric Care, He Got Jail, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Jun. 1, 2003, at 1AA (describing how Gerald Lund wound up in jail
instead of a psychiatric hospital after his family called the police to escort him to
the hospital).
22. See infra notes 78-116, 129-149 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
24. PAULA M. DITON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT, MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF INMATES AND
PROBATIONERS 1 (July 1999).
25. H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons with Severe Mental Illness
in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 483, 486 (1998).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-651 (2003).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-165 (2003); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 3 MENTAL DISABILITY L.
CIV. AND CRIM. § 5A-2 (2d ed. 2000); Ira P. Robbins, George Bush's America Meets
Dante's Inferno: The Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 49, 73 (1996).




with a mental illness continue to be punished rather than
treated.29
Surprisingly little case law has addressed the phenomenon of
the criminalization of persons with a mental illness. 30 This Article
will show that the criminalization of persons with a mental illness
is a violation of the ADA, and will demonstrate how the ADA can
be used to create systemic change in the treatment of persons with
mental illness and help end the discrimination against persons
with a mental illness in the arrest, post-arrest, and pretrial
processes. Part I of this Article will address the history of the
criminalization of persons with a mental illness and some of the
factors creating it.31 Part II will focus on the ADA and Congress'
intention in passing it.32 It will also discuss the case law applying
the ADA in arrest, post-arrest, and pretrial situations, and the
Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 33 providing a
framework for cases applying the ADA in discriminatory
institutionalization cases.3 4  Part III will establish that the
criminalization of persons with a mental illness, such as in the
cases of Chuck, Risdon, and James, constitutes discrimination
under the ADA and as such requires states to institute or improve
mental health treatment, police training, and diversion programs
for persons with a mental illness. 35
I. From the Snake Pits to the Streets to the Jail: The
Criminalization of Persons with a Mental Illness
Jails and prisons around the country are replacing mental
health institutions as repositories for persons with a mental
illness.36 In Illinois, the Cook County Jail identified more than
29. See infra Part I.
30. See William D. Gorn et al., Annotation, Rights of Prisoners Under Americans
with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act, 163 A.L.R. FED. 285 (2000). Most
cases applying the ADA are post-conviction cases regarding treatment of persons
with a mental illness in prisons. Id. However, these cases are not related to this
Article, which focuses on systems that should be in place to prevent the jailing of
persons with a mental illness in the first place. See infra notes 268-278 and
accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 36-150 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Parts IIA-B.
33. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
34. See infra Parts II.C-D.
35. See infra notes 242-289 and accompanying text.
36. See Deborah Reed, National Developments in Diversion from Incarceration
Programs, 2 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH REPORT 37, 38 (2002), at
http://www.northshorelij.com/workfiles/lawandpsych/cmhr_- 2_3_p_37.pdf (stating
this process is sometimes referred to as transinstitutionalization).
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1,000 out of11,000 inmates as having a mental illness.37 In New
York, Riker's Island is the state's largest de facto psychiatric
institution, holding at least 2,850 inmates with a mental illness on
any given day.38 The Los Angeles County Jail has been reputed to
be the nation's largest de facto psychiatric institution. 39 This
downtown Los Angeles facility alone houses about 2,800 persons
with a mental illness. 40 Studies vary in their estimates of the
percentage of inmates with a mental illness in the jails and
prisons, ranging from 6% to 31%;41 yet, rates of serious mental
illness in the general population are at only 2-3%.42 What is the
reason for this disparity?
The term "criminalization of the mentally ill" was coined in
1972 after an observation that there were an increasing number of
persons with a mental illness in a county jail who were subject to
arrest and prosecution for minor crimes.43 This observation came
toward the end of the deinstitutionalization movement of the
37. Mark Heyrman, Mass Incarceration: Perspectives on U.S. Imprisonment:
Mental Illness in Prisons and Jails, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 113, 113 (2000).
38. BARR, supra note 11, at 4. In 1999, a class action lawsuit was filed on behalf
of the 25,000 inmates treated for mental illness each year at Riker's Island to
obtain prerelease planning to ensure continued provisions for treatment following
release. Susan Saulny, City Agrees to Help Care for Mentally Ill Inmates After
Release, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at B4.
39. Julie Marquis, State's First Lady Calls for Mental Health Reform, L.A.
TIMES, July 20, 1999, at B8.
40. Id.
41. E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL:
THE ABUSE OF JAILS AS MENTAL HOSPITALS 14 (Public Citizens Research Group
and National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, 1992) [hereinafter NAMI REPORT].
These findings are similar to the results of other studies. See Linda A. Teplin,
Keeping the Peace: Police Discretion and Mentally Ill Persons, NAT'L INST. OF JUST.
J. 8, 12 (July 2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/journals/jr000244.htm
(finding nearly 9% of male detainees and more than 18% of female detainees
meeting the criteria for having a lifetime severe mental disorder). It is possible
that these numbers are underestimates because of the way the studies were
conducted. Cameron Quanbeck et al., Mania and the Law in California:
Understanding the Criminalization of the Mentally Ill, 160 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY
1245, 1245 (2003). Using other more sensitive methods during a study at the Los
Angeles County Jail, researchers found that 28% of male and 31% of female
arrestees either had a significant history of mental illness or manifested symptoms
when they were arrested. Id.
42. Quanbeck, supra note 41, at 1245.
43. Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 25, at 484. This Article considers that
criminalization of persons with a mental illness includes all contact with the
criminal justice system starting from the time of arrest. Some other commentators,
however, consider criminalization to start from the time of prosecution, while
others include only incarceration in jails and prisons. Id. See, e.g., Quanbeck,
supra note 41, at 1245 (stating that in the mid-1800s a system of care for persons
with a mental illness-arguably "institutionalization"-was established, and in 1880
during a census of U.S. jails only 0.7% of inmates suffered from a mental illness).
2005]
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1960s and 1970s.44 Notwithstanding lofty definitions and goals
identified with deinstitutionalization, it has come to represent the
large-scale release of committed patients from mental health
institutions without sufficient community preparation to receive
them.46
There is no consensus on the factors resulting in the
criminalization of persons with a mental illness.46 However, the
factors most often cited include: a. higher rate of drug and alcohol
abuse among persons with a mental illness, homelessness, law
enforcement policies and barriers, and societal attitudes.47 Most of
these factors are exacerbated by a lack of community support to
address them. 48 Whatever the causes, jails and prisons do not
provide a solution for persons with a mental illness.49
44. See LeRoy L. Kondo, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Issues, Analysis, and
Applications: Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in
the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 373, 387 (2000).
45. See PERLIN, supra note 27, § 4B-2. According to the National Institute of
Mental Health, the official definition of deinstitutionalization involves three
processes: (1) the prevention of inappropriate admissions to mental health
facilities by providing community treatment alternatives; (2) the adequate
preparation and transfer to the community of institutionalized patients not
requiring institutionalized care; and (3) "the establishment and continued
maintenance of community support systems for non-institutionalized persons
receiving mental disability services." Id. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying
text.
46. Kondo, supra note 44, at 375-77 (compiling problems pinpointed in other
sources such as deinstitutionalization, Social Security cutbacks resulting in
homelessness, arrests for non-violent offenses, and mercy arrests); Lamb &
Weinberger, supra note 25, at 486 (citing causes commonly believed to result in the
criminalization of persons with a mental illness, including: deinstitutionalization,
"the unavailability of long-term hospitalization in state hospitals for persons with
chronic and severe mental illness, more formal and rigid criteria for civil
commitment," the lack of adequate community support systems, the difficulty
persons with a mental illness have in accessing community mental health
treatment, particularly for those persons coming from the criminal justice system,
"a belief by law enforcement personnel that they can deal with deviant behavior
more quickly and efficiently within the criminal justice system than in the mental
health system," and the public's attitudes toward persons with mental disorders);
JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON, CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
HUMAN DIGNITY, 1998-1999 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2000) available at
http://www.bazelon.org/bazanrpt.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2004) ("Many are
arrested for nonviolent misdemeanors or 'crimes of survival' such as stealing food
or trespassing. Others are detained in 'mercy arrests' by police officers who find
the public mental health system unresponsive and the process of accesging its
emergency services cumbersome.").
47. See, e.g., Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 25, at 486.
48. See infra Part I.B.
49. See infra Part I.C.
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A. Out of the Snake Pits and into the Street:
Deinstitutionalization
From the mid-1800s to the 1950s, institutionalization of
persons with a mental illness was the norm. 50 Commentators
suggest that deinstitutionalization began in 1954 with the
introduction of the antipsychotic drug Thorazine. 51 In the year
following its introduction, the number of patients in state mental
hospitals declined for the first time in a century.5 2 Nonetheless, in
1955 there were still an estimated 559,000 patients in state
psychiatric institutions. 53  The horrible conditions of these
institutions led commentators to refer to them as "snake pits." 54 It
is, therefore, no wonder that the policy of deinstitutionalization
arose.55 The more important issues are why it has failed and how
it can be corrected.
Deinstitutionalization was based on the laudable ideal that
severe mental illness should be treated using the least restrictive
alternative. 56 President Jimmy Carter's Commission on Mental
Health defined the least restrictive alternative as "the objective of
maintaining the greatest degree of freedom, self-determination,
autonomy, dignity, and integrity of body, mind, and spirit for the
individual while he or she participates in treatment or receives
services."57 For three decades, the "least restrictive alternative"
has been a staple of civil mental disability law. 58
50. Kondo, supra note 44, at 383-86.
51. Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits Of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization,
Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 379 (1982).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 378.
54. See id. at 375.
55. See, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 27, § 4B-2. Professor Perlin, in his treatise on
Mental Disability Law, cites five forces that spurred the development of
deinstitutionalization: (1) the recognition that high readmission rates and
alternatives to large, impersonal institutions needed to be addressed; (2) the
exploration of ways that community care could be provided; (3) the creation of
opportunities for community programs to be reimbursed for caring for persons with
a mental illness through new and amended grant and entitlement programs; (4)
the improvement of antipsychotic drugs allowing them to be administered in the
community; and (5) the "due process revolution" leading courts to strike down
vague involuntary commitment statutes, to impose durational limitations on
commitments, and to extend the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine to decision-
making. Id.
56. E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS 10-11 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
eds., 1997) [hereinafter SHADOWS].
57. Id.
58. Michael L. Perlin, Their Promises of Paradise: Will Olmstead v. L.C.
Resuscitate the Constitutional "Least Restrictive Alternative" Principle in Mental
Disability Law?, 37 Hous. L. REV. 999, 1010-12 (2000) (arguing that the least
2005]
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Despite these good intentions, the community-based
initiatives that were to replace the mental health institutions the
never fully materialized. 59  As originally envisioned,
deinstitutionalization involved the replacement of psychiatric
hospitals with outpatient clinics, residential programs, supported
employment, and other necessary services. 60 However, not only
are the mental health treatment, housing, and rehabilitation
resources insufficient to meet the needs of persons with a mental
illness in most communities, 61 those who have been in jail may not
restrictive alternative doctrine "has been invoked in virtually every major
challenge to the limitations of the substantive involuntary civil commitment power,
as well as in nearly every significant test case seeking a judicial declaration of a
right to treatment, a right to refuse treatment, or a right to aftercare and/or
deinstitutionalization," and is "incorporated in many civil commitment statutes,"
and is daily "invoked at individual commitment hearings") [hereinafter L.R.A.]; see
also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 177-83 (2003) (allowing the Government to
involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to a defendant with a mental illness
facing serious criminal charges to render that defendant competent to stand trial,
but only after taking account of less intrusive alternatives); Riggins v. Nevada, 504
U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (holding that a 'less in'trusive alternative" methodology must
be used to determine whether a defendant in a competent-to-stand-trial insanity
defense pleader has the right to refuse the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic medications at trial); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982)
(articulating a constitutionally-minimal standard of "reasonably nonrestrictive
confinement conditions"); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
(integrating least restrictive alternative principles into involuntary civil
commitment challenges).
59. Rhoden, supra note 51, at 392-94 (suggesting that factors contributing to the
failure of deinstutionalization include that it did not begin as a formalized policy,
but was, rather, an organic process; that the lack of a social consensus about
deinstitutionalization impeded its implementation; that the various policies were
"implemented in a disorganized and unrealistic manner"; that services were rarely
delivered in "an organized, systemic manner"; and that "rigid funding policies"
meant to facilitate deinstitutionalization "make it difficult for money to follow
patients from institutions to community settings"); see also L. Elaine Sutton
Mbionwu, Special Needs Populations with Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice
System, 6 PROT. & ADVOC. NEWS 3 (2001), at http://www.napas.org/I-6/Crim%20
Jus%20P&A%20news%2010-01.htm (identifying six problems with
deinstitutionalization: "1) lack of appropriate discharge planning; 2) lack of person-
centered planning; 3) uninvolved family members; 4) absence of community
supports; 5) budget-cuts and dollars that did not follow the individuals into the
community"; and 6) communities that were neither "ready nor had the capacity to
absorb this special needs population.").
60. NAMI REPORT, supra note 41, at 52; see also Rhoden, supra note 51, at 400.
61. For example, neither the criminal justice system nor the local mental health
agencies are providing adequate case management essential to a well-functioning
mental health program. Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 25, at 487. In addition,
requirements that people with a mental illness come to an outpatient clinic for
treatment is inappropriate when what many of them need is outreach services. Id.
The President's 2003 New Freedom Commission on Mental Health found in its
final report that the
[miental health delivery system is fragmented and in disarray ...
lead[ing] to unnecessary and costly disability, homelessness, school failure
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be able to access these resources if they are seen as difficult. 62 As
a result, the "least restrictive setting" has often taken the form of
"a cardboard box, a jail cell, or a terror-filled existence plagued by
both real and imaginary enemies."63  Thus, it is not
deinstitutionalization that has led to the criminalization of
persons with a mental illness, but the failure to provide
community treatment alternatives. In a sense, by criminalizing
persons with mental illness, deinstitutionalization never really
occurred; society has simply changed the form of the institution.
64
B. From the Streets to the Jail: Factors Contributing to the
Criminalization of Persons with a Mental Illness
One study shows that 42-50% of persons with a mental
illness will be arrested at some point in their lives, 65 compared
and incarceration . . . . In many communities, access to quality care is
poor, resulting in wasted resources and lost opportunities for recovery.
More individuals could recover from even the most serious mental illnesses
if they had access in their communities to treatment and supports that are
tailored to their needs.
PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING THE
PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 3 (2003), available at
http://www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/FinalReport/toc.html (last visited
Sept. 22, 2004).
62. See Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 25, at 487. Persons with a mental
illness who have been in jail often find mental health treatment out of their reach
because the mental health system resists providing treatment to people it describes
as resistant to treatment, dangerous, seriously substance abusing, and
"sociopathic." Id. 'This reluctance extends to virtually all areas of community
based care, including therapeutic housing, social and vocational rehabilitation, and
general social service." Id. As a result, "these mentally ill persons are left for the
criminal justice system to manage." Id.
63. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 609 (1999) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (quoting
SHADOWS, supra note 56, at 11); see also Rhoden, supra note 51, at 375 (describing
the conditions persons with a mental illness find themselves in as a result of
deinstitutionalization).
64. See Reed, supra note 36, at 38 (describing diversion programs as a result of
criminalization of mentally ill persons).
65. Jeffrey Draine et al., Role of Social Disadvantage in Crime, Joblessness, and
Homelessness Among Persons with Serious Mental Illness, 53 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 565, 566 (2002); see also John S. Brekke et al., Risks for Individuals with
Schizophrenia Who Are Living in the Community, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1358,
1359 (2001) (evaluating "clients in an assertive community treatment program over
a one-year period" to find that "41% had at least one police contact but were not
arrested, and 28% were arrested and incarcerated" (citing N. Wolff et al., A New
Look at an Old Issue: People with Mental Illness and the Law Enforcement System,
24 J. MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN. 152 (1999)); Robin Clark et al., Legal System
Involvement and Costs for Persons in Treatment for Severe Mental Illness and
Substance Use Disorders, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 641, 644 (1999) (83% (169
individuals) of a sample of 223 individuals with a co-occurring substance abuse
disorder had contact with the legal system and more than half of these had been
arrested at least once in a three-year period).
Law and Inequality [Vol. 23:157
with another study that indicates only 7-8% of the general
population will have contact with the police.66 Other studies show
that persons with a mental illness are more likely to be arrested
than the general population.67 Factors that contribute to these
higher arrest rates include: (1) a greater incidence of drug and
alcohol abuse among persons with serious mental illnesses; (2)
homelessness; (3) mercy, emergency, and nuisance bookings; (4)
barriers to effective police responses; and (5) faulty public
perceptions of mental illness.
1. Drug and Alcohol Abuse
Although the rate of criminal behavior for persons with a
mental illness is not higher than that of the general population,
this changes when the mental illness co-occurs with substance
abuse. 68 Unfortunately, as was the case with Chuck and James,
people with a mental illness often use alcohol and illegal drugs as
self-medication to relieve the symptoms of their illness.69 As using
illegal drugs is a crime, and alcohol itself may lead to behavior
that may be considered criminal, when a person with a mental
illness has a co-occurring substance abuse problem, the odds of
him or her being arrested increase significantly.7 0 According to
66. Brekke et aL, supra note 65, at 1363.
67. Linda Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative Arrest Rate
of the Mentally Ill, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 794, 794 (1984). Observers watched Chicago
officers over a 2,200 hour, fourteen-month period, and documented 1,382
officer/citizen encounters. Id. at 797-98. Of this number, officers arrested only
27.9% of the suspects without mental disorders and 46.7% of the suspects with
mental disorders. Id. at 798. See also Brekke et al., supra note 65, at 1364 (finding
the arrest rate for persons with schizophrenia in Los Angeles 45% higher than the
arrest rate for the general population).
68. Heyrman, supra note 37, at 114; see also DITTON, supra note 24, at 1 (stating
that "[s]tate prison inmates with a mental condition were more likely than other
inmates to be incarcerated for a violent offense" and "more likely than others to be
under the influence of alcohol at the time of current offense"); Lamb & Weinberger,
supra note 25, at 488 C'.... mental illness may appear to the police as simply alcohol
or drug intoxication, especially if the mentally ill person has been using drugs or
alcohol at the time of arrest."); TRIAD REPORT, supra note 1, at 22 (describing a
story of an individual with a mental illness who died because he did not receive
proper medication in jail).
69. Heyrman, supra note 37, at 114 (2000); see also NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE
MENTALLY ILL, DUAL DIAGNOSIS AND INTEGRATED TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS
AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE DISORDER (2003) at www.nami.org/Content/
ContentGroups/Helpline 1/DuaLDiagnosis-andIntegratedTreatment_ofMentalI
llnessandSubstanceAbuse_Disorder.htm (last visited October 12, 2004)
(discussing the consequences of alcohol abuse co-occurring with a mental illness)
[hereinafter DUAL DIAGNOSIS]. Various studies show a range of 14.7-61% of those
affected with severe mental disorders are also affected by substance abuse. Id.
70. Heyrman, supra note 37, at 114.
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the Department of Justice, six in ten inmates with a mental illness
were under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of their
arrest, and about a third were found to be alcohol dependent.7 1
This kind of abuse is even higher among the indigent, such as
James, who have less access to supportive living situations, health
care, and proper medication. 7
2
2. Homelessness
Deinstitutionalization and the absence of community support
led to an increase in the numbers of homeless, like James, who
have a mental illness.73 The combination of mental illness and
homelessness, in turn, appears to be a major factor in the arrest
rate of persons with a mental illness.7 4 The Department of Justice
found that 30% of inmates with a mental illness in jail were
homeless for a period in the twelve months prior to their arrest.75
This is almost twice the homeless rate of other inmates. 7 6 Some of
this disparity can be attributed to the increase in municipal
ordinances criminalizing behavior by homeless persons, which
may, in turn, be a reflection of society's perceptions of the
homeless and of persons with a mental illness. 77
71. DITTON, supra note 24, at 7.
72. Heyrman, supra note 37, at 114; see also TRIAD REPORT, supra note 1, at 12
(nearly 10% of those surveyed had no health insurance); DUAL DIAGNOSIS, supra
note 69 (stating the reasons for a higher rate of drug abuse among "people with
mental illnesses who became indigent by reason of their illness" as including:
"living in marginal neighborhoods where drug use prevails"; poor social skills
resulting in finding acceptance easier in groups that use a lot of drugs; and a belief
that identification as a drug addict is more socially acceptable than being identified
as having a mental illness).
73. PERLIN, supra note 27, § 4B-3.2c. While deinstitutionalization is one factor
in the increased number of homeless who have a mental illness, there are other
factors as well. For example, about a third of the people whose benefits were
discontinued following the Reagan administration cutbacks of Supplemental Social
Security Income had a mental illness. Id. § 4B-3.2d. This has been a significant
factor in the increase in homelessness. Id.
74. PERLIN, supra note 27, § 4B-3.1a.
75. DITTON, supra note 24, at 3. Other studies show similar results. See, e.g.,
Daniel A. Martell et al., Base-Rate Estimates of Criminal Behavior by Homeless
Mentally Ill Persons in New York City, 46 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 596, 597 (1995)
(finding that 43% of defendants with a mental illness in New York City were
homeless when arrested).
76. DITTON, supra note 24, at 5.




3. Mercy Bookings, Emergency Detention, and
Misdemeanors
With a lack of community resources and numerous other
obstacles, police officers often use their own techniques to obtain
treatment for persons with a mental illness. 78 Mercy bookings
occur when officers invent charges against individuals with a
serious mental illness so they can have shelter, food, and "access to
some form of treatment."79 In most cases, officers take this action
because they believe that there are no appropriate community
alternatives available, and so they bring the person with the
mental illness to jail.8 0 Aggravating this problem is the fact that
some states allow detention of persons with a serious mental
illness even with no criminal charges against them.8 1 According to
a 1992 survey, states with such laws are almost twice as likely to
do detain as states without such laws. 8 2 In addition, oftentimes
families will intentionally have their family member with a mental
illness arrested because it is the only way to obtain psychiatric
treatment.8
3
As of 1997, roughly 70% of persons with a mental illness held
in local jails were there for non-violent crimes, with a quarter of
offenders having been charged with public-order offenses.8 4
According to a 1992 survey conducted by the National Alliance for
the Mentally Ill, examples of disorderly conduct and public
nuisance charges include homelessness, roaming public streets,
urinating in public, and "just acting strangely" or hallucinating.8 5
Not only are some of these charges not really crimes, they are also
78. See Heyrman, supra note 37, at 115-16.
79. NAMI REPORT, supra note 41, at 43.
80. See H. Richard Lamb et al., The Police and Mental Health, 53 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 1266, 1267 (2002) [hereinafter Police and Mental Health].
81. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-67(4) (2003) (stating that "an emergency
patient may be detained at a "mental health facility or any other available suitable
location as the court may so designate... [provided], [hiowever, the respondent
shall not be held in ... jail unless the court finds that there is no reasonable
alternative"). But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.459(1) (2003) (stating that the
noncriminal mentally ill "shall not be detained or incarcerated in the jails of this
state").
82. NAMI REPORT, supra note 41, at 44-45 (noting that in states like Mississippi,
Kentucky, and Florida, persons with a serious mental illness may be held for weeks
while waiting for a bed in a state hospital).
83. Id. at 47.
84. DITTON, supra note 24, at 4.
85. NAMI REPORT, supra note 41, at 19-20 n.20.
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most likely manifestations of an untreated mental illness. 86
4. Barriers to Effective Police Responses
Following deinstitutionalization, police departments reported
an increase in mental illness-related calls. For example, in a
suburb of Philadelphia, from 1975 to 1979, the police reported an
increase of 227.6% in mental illness-related incidents.87 When
Agnews State Hospital, in Santa Clara County, California, was
closed in the early 1970s, the number of people with a mental
illness in the county jail increased by 300%.88 This trend
continued through the 1990s, with twenty-five states showing an
increase in the number of inmates with a mental illness from 1991
to 1999.89 An additional three states reported anecdotal evidence
of an increase. 90 This has obviously altered the job of police
officers. 91
Police are typically the first to be called to respond to
situations involving persons with a mental illness and they have a
legal obligation to respond to these calls. 92 In all states, the police
have the authority to transport persons with a mental illness for
psychiatric evaluation and treatment if there is probable cause to
believe that the person's mental condition rises to a level where he
or she is a danger to herself, himself, or others.93 Consequently,
the police are inherently responsible for determining if a person is
in need of treatment and, if so, deciding whether treatment at a
hospital or detention in a jail is more appropriate. 94 Thus, the
police may act as involuntary gatekeepers-determining whether
the legal or mental health system can better meet the needs of the
86. H. Richard Lamb & Leona L. Bachrach, Some Perspectives on
Deinstitutionalization, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1039, 1042 (2001).
87. J.C. Bonovitz & J.S. Bonovitz, Diversions of the Mentally Ill into the Criminal
Justice System: The Police Intervention Perspective, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 973
(1981).
88. Quanbeck et al., supra note 41, at 1245 (citing G.E. Whitmer, From Hospitals
To Jails: The Fate of California's Deinstitutionalized Mentally Ill, 50 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 65 (1980)).
89. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, PROVISION OF
MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS 2-3 (2001), available at
http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2001/016724.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2004) [hereinafter
PROVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS].
90. Id.
91. Teplin, supra note 41, at 9.





individual with a mental illness.95
Police responses to the gatekeeper function range from
officers who see it as their duty, to officers who resent it.96 These
personal feelings can affect the exercise of the officer's discretion if
there is no oversight, and result in inconsistent police responses. 97
These responses may vary from officers who arrest persons with a
mental illness more often, to officers who make more of an effort to
obtain hospitalization, to others who simply release the person
with the mental illness with no charge and no treatment. 98
Officers and departments who want to provide proper
treatment often face significant barriers, such as time and
distance. 99 Officers often face lengthy wait times at emergency
rooms.10 0 When officers must wait for emergency room care, they
cannot attend to their other obligations. 101 Additionally, mental
health professionals may often question the opinion of the officer
and refuse admission or admit the person for too brief a period. 102
Another problem, particularly in rural areas, is the great distance
to a psychiatric facility. 10 3 In the face of these problems, officers
are tempted to rely on processes with which they have more
familiarity and control, such as arrest.104
In addition to these barriers, the training that police receive
to identify and deal with mental illness is generally inadequate. 0 5
When asked, officers have expressed a desire to learn more about
issues related to mental illness, such as how to recognize when
someone has a mental illness, how to deal with psychotic behavior
including violence or potential violence when it arises, and how to
respond to a person who is threatening suicide. 0 6 Officers would
also like to know more about available community resources, and
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1267.
98. Id.
99. Id.; NAMI REPORT, supra note 39, at 44-45.
100.Police and Mental Health, supra note 77, at 1267.
101. Id.
102. Id; see also Heyrman, supra note 37, at 115-16 (describing to what lengths
some officers are willing to go to get hospital treatment for a person with a mental
illness).
103. NAMI REPORT, supra note 41, at 44-45.
104. See Police and Mental Health, supra note 80, at 1267.
105. Id. at 1269 (referring to J.R. Husted et al., California Law Enforcement
Agencies and the Mentally Ill Offender, 23 BULL. AM. AcAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L.
315, 315 (1995)).
106. Police and Mental Health, supra note 80, at 1269.
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how they can be accessed. 0 7
A lack of sufficient training among officers may result in not
recognizing a mental illness or misidentifying symptoms of mental
illness as drug or alcohol intoxication, which becomes even more
confusing when the person with the mental illness has been using
those substances. 0 8 When officers must use force to subdue a
person, they may also be more likely to miss symptoms of mental
illness.109
Fatal encounters between police and persons with a mental
illness are visible in the news." 0 It appears that oftentimes these
situations arose because of a combination of the person with the
mentaln iiines not receiving proper treatment and encounterng an
improper police response, aggravating the situation."' One
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1267.
109. Id.
110. For example, in Minnesota there have been at least four shooting deaths by
police of people suffering from mental illness since 2000, and at least one killing of
a police officer. Heron Marquez Estrada, St. Paul Sued Over Death of Man Killed
By Cops, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 26, 2003, at B3 (reporting on Ki Yang, a
man with a history of schizophrenia, shot to death by police after charging at police
with a BB gun resembling a rifle and a 20-inch sickle-like blade); David Chanen,
Shootings Highlight Police Moves to Change Procedure, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Dec. 17, 2000, at A13 (reporting on the police shooting of Rocco Dandrea, a man
described as having a mental illness, after he pointed a toy gun at the police);
Heron Marquez Estrada & David Chanen, Man Killed By Police Had Disorder,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 2, 2000, at Al ("Less than 24 hours after an
unsuccessful attempt by relatives to have Alfred Sanders committed for a mental
evaluation, the 29 year old man was shot to death ... by Minneapolis police after
he reportedly sped toward them."); Joy Powell, Questions Linger About What Cops
Knew Before They Fired on Mentally Ill Woman, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 2,
2000, at Al (reporting on the police shooting of Barbara Schneider, a woman
suffering from bipolar disorder, after they entered her apartment and she came at
them with a knife calling them the "Satan Squad"). Similar news can be found
elsewhere. See Editorial, Cops and the Mentally Ill, L. A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1999, at
B8 (stating that between 1994 and 1999, Los Angeles police shot 37 people who
exhibited irrational behavior or symptoms of mental illness, 25 of whom died)
[hereinafter L.A. Times Editorial]; Pete Donohue & John Marzulli, Slashed Officer
Recalls Horror, NEWSDAY, Apr. 29, 1999, at 20 (reporting forcible submission of
suspect with a mental illness by police after suspect slashed an officer with a
knife).
111. See L.A. Times Editorial, supra note 110 (reporting that from 1994 to 1999
at least a dozen killings of persons who had a mental illness or were considered
unstable were the result of confrontations involving questionable police tactics and
use of deadly force); Bernard K. Melekian, It Takes More than Cops to Handle the
Anguished Loose on the Streets, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1999, at B9 (writing as Chief
of Police in Pasadena that both improved training of the police and increased
community mental health opportunities are needed to stop the problem of violent
encounters between the police and persons with a mental illness). Other examples
are: an officer killed Margaret Laverne Mitchell after fearing that she was going to
harm him with a screwdriver; an officer shot and injured J. Pantera after he threw
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possible reason for this improper response is the perception by
officers that persons with a mental illness are more prone to
violence, which may cause officers to approach them more
aggressively, possibly escalating the situation and even evoking
unnecessary violence. 112 Although there is a minority violent
subgroup of persons with a mental illness who pose a large
challenge both to mental health professionals and to the police, the
majority of persons who have a mental illness are not violent. 113
Nonetheless, it is becoming increasingly apparent that neither the
police nor the psychiatric emergency teams alone are able to
respond to these individuals and the kinds of situations they
pose. 114 In order to resolve these crises, reduce criminalization,
and protect persons with a mental illness, it is necessary for the
two systems to work closely together. 115 In fact, studies show that
communities with specialized response systems combining the
criminal justice system and the mental health system, including
greater training for officers, had arrest rates of persons with an
apparent mental illness a third less than those without specialized
systems.116
5. Public Views of Mental Illness
Public views of mental illness add to the difficulty in
diverting persons with a mental illness out of the criminal justice
system. 117 For example, people have a variety of views of persons
with a mental illness that include seeing them as different, less
a grapefruit at the officer's car. L.A. Times Editorial, supra note 106. See also, e.g.,
Powell, supra note 110, at Al (in response to complaints of loud music and request
for mental health crisis team, police barged into the apartment and shot and killed
a woman with a mental illness despite being given warnings to ask for help from
building manager); Dan Morrison, Seattle Case Where Cops Held Fire, NEWSDAY,
Apr. 8, 1997, at A03 (comparing the shooting deaths of three men and a teenager by
police after the victims threatened the police and others with weapons to an eleven-
hour standoff in Seattle where police eventually subdued a patient with a mental
illness threatening police and others with a sword). But see Police and Mental
Health, supra note 80, at 1269 (noting that "suicide by cop," defined as a suicidal
individual acting in a life-threatening way toward officers or civilians specifically to
provoke officers to fire at the suicidal individual in self-defense or to protect others,
accounts for 11-46% of those shot, depending on location and length of time).
112. See Amy Watson et al., Police Officers' Attitudes Toward and Decisions
About Persons with Mental Illness, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 49, 52 (2004).
113. See infra notes 120-128 and accompanying text.
114. Henry J. Steadman et al., Comparing Outcomes of Major Models of Police




117. Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 25, at 488-89.
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than human, dangerous and frightening, like children,
incompetent to participate in normal activities, or not trying hard
enough to be normal.118 Some people see mental illness as a
deliberate attempt to avoid punishment, and others view diversion
as special treatment for people who have committed crimes. 119
One of the largest stigmas placed on persons with a mental
illness is the belief that they are prone to violence. 20  This
ignorance and fear also leads to discrimination and policies that
may contribute to the criminalization of persons with a mental
illness. 12' For example, the belief that persons with a mental
illness are prone to violence may influence the placement of
transitional housing, the availability of community treatment, and
employment opportunities. 122
While it is true that individuals with a severe mental illness
are more likely to commit acts of violence, only a small percentage
of people who have a mental illness become violent, and those
violent offenses account for only a small fraction of the violence in
America. 2 For example, in one study of offenders with a mental
illness approximately half of all violent offenses committed by
persons with a mental illness were committed by participants with
substance abuse disorders.1 24 On the contrary, participants with
psychotic disorders accounted for only 1% of the violent offenses. 25
The same study showed that persons with a mental illness
committed only 10% of violent crimes.' 26 In fact, persons with a
mental illness are more likely to be victims of violence than to be
118. PREJUDICE, supra note 28, at 43-47.
119. See Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 25, at 489; PREJUDICE, supra note 28,
at 46.
120. See STEPHEN BLUMENTHAL & TONY LAVENDER, VIOLENCE AND MENTAL
DISORDER 14-16 (2000); see also Heather Stuart & Julio E. Arboleda-Fl6rez, A
Public Health Perspective on Violent Offenses Among Persons with Mental Illness,
52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 654, 659 (2001). A 1980 study of college students showed
that 52% believed that 'aggression, hostility, [and] violence' were common or very
common attributes" of mental illness. SHADOWS, supra note 56, at 56 ("A 1987
study of residents of Ohio revealed that 'perceived dangerousness' was the single
most important factor contributing to the stigma of mental illness.").
121. SHADOWS, supra note 56, at 57.
122. Stuart & Arboleda-Fl6rez, supra note 120, at 659.
123. Id. 657; see also BLUMENTHAL & LAVENDER, supra note 120, at 52-54
(explaining why psychiatric diagnosis are unproductive as predictors of violence);
Elizabeth Walsh et al., Violence and Schizophrenia: Examining the Evidence, 180
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 490, 494 (2002) ("[A]lthough a statistical relationship does
exist between schizophrenia and violence, only a small proportion of societal
violence can be attributed to persons with schizophrenia.").
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arrested for it.127 Of individuals with a mental illness who become
violent, past history of violence, concurrent abuse of drugs and
alcohol, and failure to take medications contribute to this tendency
and could be targeted for special attention. 128 Thus, society's fear
concerning violent tendencies of individuals with a mental illness
is unfounded and needs to change if the criminalization of this
population is going to end.
C. Jails and Prisons as the New Mental Health Institutions:
An Ineffective and Unhealthy Answer
In 1998, there were over 280,000 persons with a mental
illness held in jails.129  Inmates with mental illness face
substantial problems in jail and strain scarce resources.1 30 One of
the primary problems is that jails have rigid rules, with a primary
objective of punishing those who have broken laws and teaching
them how to follow the rules.13' This system assumes everyone
understands the rules and punishes those who are presumed to
choose not to follow them.132 As such, persons with mental
illnesses are more likely than their counterparts to be charged
with breaking prison or jail rules. 33 Often, persons with a mental
illness do not understand these rules or are simply exhibiting
127. Brekke et al., supra note 65, at 1365 (finding that individuals with
schizophrenia in Los Angeles are at least fourteen times more likely to be victims of
violent crime than to be arrested for one).
128. See BARR, supra note 11, at 12 (discussing New York City's Assertive
Community Treatment team model as a mobile team that works with difficult or
treatment-resistant clients by bringing psychiatric, case management, drug
treatment, and vocational services to the client's home).
129. DIrrTON, supra note 24, at 1.
130. HUM. RTS. WATCH, ILL-EQUIPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 49-69 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
usal003/usal003.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2004) [hereinafter HUM. RTS. WATCH].
For example, in Pennsylvania it costs an additional $60 a day to incarcerate a
prisoner with a mental illness-from $80 for the average prisoner to $140 for the
prisoner with a mental illness. Id. at 49. Yet, prison mental health budgets are
being cut due to the fiscal crisis facing the United States. Id. at 50. Inmates in
Alabama have reported needing to harm themselves in order to receive needed
treatment, but this may only result in disciplinary action and segregation. Id. at
137. In California, a federal judge handed down an opinion against the California
Department of Corrections citing "a rampant pattern of improper or inadequate
care that nearly defies belief." Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1212 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (quoting Dr. Start's report).
131. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 130, at 53, 60.
132. Id. at 53.
133. DITTON, supra note 24, at 9. For example, 51.9% of state prison inmates
without a mental illness were charged with breaking prison rules, compared to
62.2% of inmates with a mental illness. Id.
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manifestations of their mental illness.134  Punishments for
noncompliance may take the form of segregation, beatings, and
other forms of abuse, and at the very least exacerbate the
illness.135 Problems with following the rules and misunderstood
manifestations of the mental illness also frequently result in
prisoners with a mental illness serving more time in prison than
other offenders.136
The behavior of inmates with mental illness may trigger
violent responses by other inmates. 137 This abuse may take the
form of beatings, exploitation, extortion, and rape. 138 As one jail
official eloquently said, "[t]he bad and the mad just don't mix."'139
This behavior may be made worse by the policies of the jail. For
example, in Los Angeles, inmates with a mental illness are easily
targeted because they wear uniforms of a different color and have
the letter "M" on their nametags. 40 Risk of suicide and self-
mutilation are also major problems, with the risk of suicide at two-
and-a-half times that of the U.S. population at large.' 4 1
These difficulties, particular to inmates with a mental illness,
require additional attention from jail staff, taking them away from
other duties. 142 A contributing problem is the lack of training for
correctional officers about the problems of persons with a serious
mental illness. 143 According to a 2001 survey by the National
Institute of Corrections, while forty departments of corrections in
the United States require correctional staff to receive training on
how to manage inmates with a mental illness, the training is
minimal.1 44 Only thirty offer pre-service training, all offering less
than four hours, and only twenty-two provide in-service training,
with most offering less than four hours of training annually.145
134. HuM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 130, at 65.
135. Id. at 65, 78-86, 147-60.
136. DITTON, supra note 24, at 8. In state prisons, offenders with a mental
illness could expect to serve fifteen months longer than other offenders from the
time of admission to the time of expected release. Id. This was not true, however,
for inmates with mental illness in local jails who were expected to serve less time
than other inmates. Id.
137. HuM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 130, at 56.
138. Id. at 56-57.
139. SHADOWS, supra note 56, at 32.
140. Duncan Campbell, 300,000 Mentally ill People in US Jails, THE GUARDIAN
(Manchester), Mar. 3, 2003, at 15.
141. HuM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 130, at 174-78.
142. Id. at 75.
143. Id. at 76.




A lack of access to psychiatric treatment exacerbates the
problems faced by inmates with a mental illness. 146 In 1999, the
Department of Justice reported that only 41% of inmates in local
jails received treatment for, mental illness since admission. 147
Protecting persons with a mental illness from those who may try
to hurt them, including themselves, treating those that are
injured, and fighting lawsuits brought in response to beatings by
guards creates enormous costs for states. 148 Incarcerating persons
with a mental illness also often results in a worsening of
psychiatric symptoms and other medical conditions. 49 Given all of
these difficulties, it does not seem that jail is the answer to the
problems faced by persons with a mental illness.
The criminalization of persons with a mental illness has been
increasing since the deinstitutionalization movement in the 1970s,
resulting in a higher percentage of individuals with a mental
illness coming into contact with the criminal justice system.150
The primary reason is a lack of community treatment alternatives
to address many of the problems that result in a higher arrest
rate, including a lack of mental health treatment, drug and alcohol
abuse, and homelessness.' 5 1 Contributing to these problems are
arrests of persons with a mental illness for no crime at all, mercy
bookings, or arrests for manifestations of the mental illness. 152
These inappropriate arrests are caused by a variety of barriers to
effective police response, including a lack of training and public
misconceptions of mental illness. Whatever the reasons, jail is not
the answer to the problems faced by persons with a mental illness.
The ADA provides a legal means to work toward the systemic
change that needs to take place to address these problems and
146. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 130, at 94-140.
147. DITTON, supra note 24, at 1. Interestingly, there are exceptions where some
persons with a mental illness find jail or prison a positive experience, usually
because it was the only place they could get treatment. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra
note 130, at 27.
148. See, e.g., Hector Tobar, County OKs Payment in Jail Beating, L.A. TIMES,
June 9, 1992, at B1 (stating that Los Angeles County Officials in June 1992 settled
for $1.75 million a case involving a paranoid schizophrenic inmate who had been
severely beaten by guards at the jail because he had been violating "rules requiring
inmates to remain silent, place their hands in their pockets and keep their shirts
tucked in"); HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 130, at 87-88 (indicating that the State
of Connecticut paid out $2.9 million to the estate of inmate Timothy Perry, a
twenty-one-year-old man with schizophrenia who died at the hands of prison
officials using excessive force to restrain and sedate him).
149. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 130, at 53-56.
150. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 65-116 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 87-128 and accompanying text.
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significantly diminish the criminalization of persons with a mental
illness.
II. The ADA: A Revolution for Persons with a Mental
Illness
Advocates have called the ADA "a breathtaking promise,"
"the most important civil rights act passed since 1964," and the
"Emancipation Proclamation for those with disabilities." 153 The
House Committee of the Judiciary called it "a clear and
comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against
individuals with disabilities."1 5 4 Passage of the ADA led mental
ia, '"' activists, t,,o -'+ +hope tha it wiuld alleviate some of
uisavlJlly 11 5 1flU
the problems that lead to the criminalization of persons with a
mental illness.155 Much of this hope is based upon Congress'
intention that passage of the ADA would to lead to systemic
change that would result in the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. 156
Despite congressional intentions, the ADA has had only
limited success in the courts in arrest, post-arrest, and pretrial
situations, and it has done little to alleviate the criminalization of
persons with a mental illness. 157 The Supreme Court's decision in
Olmstead v. L.C., however, provides a new framework for decisions
affecting persons with mental disabilities under the ADA. 158
A. Establishing and Remedying a Violation of the ADA
Title II of the ADA is the most useful to persons with mental
disabilities in the pretrial context by focusing on public entities
and services. 159 In order to establish a claim, a person must show:
153. PREJUDICE, supra note 28, at 175.
154. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF
1990, H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 23 (1990).
155. L.R.A., supra note 58, at 1028.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2003).
157. See infra Part IL.C.
158. 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999). This case is discussed in Part II.D.
159. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (2003). There are two other primary titles: Title I,
which prohibits discrimination in employment situations, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17,
and Title III, which focuses on the accessibility requirement for private entities. 42
U.S.C. §§ 12181-89. Currently, there is a circuit split as to whether Title II of the
ADA is a valid exercise of Congress' Section Five power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Jennifer Lav, Conceptualizations of Disability and the
Constitutionality of Remedial Schemes Under the Americans With Disabilities Act,
34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 197, 233 (2002). In 2001, the Court decided in
University of Alabama v. Garrett that it is unconstitutional for private individuals
to collect money damages from states for Title I violations of the ADA unless there
20051
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(1) that she or he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that
she or he was excluded from participation in or denied benefits of a
public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise
discriminated against; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of
benefits, or discrimination was because of the individual's
disability. 160 Proof of intentional discrimination is unnecessary to
establish an ADA violation. 161
To become a qualified individual under the ADA, a person
must have a disability that, "with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices ... or the provision of
auxiliary aids and services," allows the individual with the
disability to meet the eligibility requirements in order to receive
"services or participate in programs or activities provided by a
public entity."'162
Prisoners with a mental disability are qualified individuals
under the ADA. According to the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,1 63 prisoners with disabilities
who are held against their will are qualified individuals under the
ADA because prisons are public entities, 164 and because meeting
the eligibility requirements and participating in programs or
activities does not require voluntariness. This means that a
person held against her will for committing a crime is eligible to
participate in the services provided by a prison.' 65 Thus, prisoners
is a pattern of discrimination by the states in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). However, this has little effect on the issue
presented here which is looking only for injunctive remedies.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2003); see also Panzardi-Santiago v. Univ. of Puerto Rico,
200 F. Supp. 2d 1 (P.R. Dec. 2002) (reaffirming this standard).
161. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296-97 (1985). In Alexander, the
Supreme Court held that it is unnecessary to find intent to discriminate in a
federally funded program for a violation to exist under the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
Because both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA use the same language regarding
discrimination of the disabled, courts have applied this same holding to the ADA.
See, e.g., Concerned Parents to Save Dreher Park Ctr. v. City of West Palm Beach,
846 F. Supp. 986, 991 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ("Certainly intentional discrimination is
banned by Title II. But further, actions that have the effect of discriminating
against individuals with disabilities likewise violate the ADA."); see Peoples v. Nix,
3 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 873 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("A showing of discriminatory
intent is not necessary to sustain a claim of violation of the ADA.").
162. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2003).
163. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
164. In Yeskey, the Supreme Court held that the ADA applied to inmates in state
prisons by arguing that state prisons fell "squarely within the statutory definition
of public entity." 524 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1998). The ADA defines a "public entity" as
"any State or local government; [and] any department, agency, special purpose
district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." 42
U.S.C. § 12131.
165. Yesky, 524 U.S. at 211. Yeskey had been sentenced to serve eighteen to
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with a mental illness qualify under Yeskey because a mental
illness is considered a disability under the ADA.166
In order to remedy discrimination under the ADA, public
entities must make reasonable modifications to policies, practices,
and procedures unless the public entity can demonstrate that
making such modification would result in a fundamental
alteration. 167 The Supreme Court in Olmstead u. L.C. explained
that the fundamental-alteration component may be used "to show
that in the allocation of available resources, immediate relief for
the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility the
State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and
diverse population of persons with mental disabilities."'16 8
However, this argument does not allow the state to delay making
the modification indefinitely. 169
B. The ADA- Congressional Focus on Systemic Change and
Elimination of Barriers to Equal Participation by Persons
with Disabilities
The language of the ADA shows an understanding by
Congress that the environment society has constructed through its
policies, practices, and structures often excludes those with
disabilities and is thus a form of discrimination. 170 For example,
the ADA's definition of a disability includes disabilities that limit
the person's major life activities. 71 To be a qualified individual
with a disability, the ADA requires both a medical condition and a
thirty-six months in a Pennsylvania correctional facility. Id. at 208. The
sentencing court recommended that he be placed in Pennsylvania's Motivational
Bootcamp for first-time offenders. Id. The successful completion of the bootcamp
would have allowed Yeskey to be released on parole after six months. Id. However,
he was refused admission due to a medical history of hypertension. Id. The
question the Court addressed was only whether the ADA applied to inmates in
state prisons. It did not address whether preventing Yeskey from attending the
bootcamp was a violation of the ADA. Id.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2003).
167. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2003) ("A public entity shall make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity
can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of the service, program, or activity.") (emphasis added).
168. 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999).
169. See id. at 605-06.
170. Lav, supra note 159, at 211.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2003) ("The term 'disability' means, with respect to an
individual - (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual ....").
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need for "reasonable modifications" to be eligible for programs. 172
"Reasonable modifications" are then required in order to remedy
the discrimination faced by the disabled. 173  This language
acknowledges the barriers created by society and requires that
these barriers be removed in order for persons with disabilities to
become equal participants in society.174
Congress' findings emphasize its mandate for systemic
change by focusing on both the medical and environmental causes
of discrimination against persons with disabilities. 175 Specifically,
Congress found historical isolation and segregation of individuals
with disabilities, discrimination in institutionalization and access
to public services, and discrimination due to "overprotective rules
and policies."'1 76 Congress also borrowed language from the famed
footnote four of the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v.
Carolene Products1 77 in finding that "individuals with disabilities
are a discrete and insular minority ... subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society."'' 7 Congress found that this
discrimination arose due to characteristics beyond the control of
the disabled and from faulty assumptions about the ability of the
disabled "to participate in, and contribute to, society."' 79  This
language acknowledges the socially imposed barriers limiting the
full participation of persons with disabilities in society.
Additionally, it indicates Congress' intention to create a "protected
class" status for persons with disabilities by challenging the
Supreme Court's decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center.180 In City of Cleburne, the Court held that persons with
mental disabilities are not a protected class, but indicated that
laws discriminating against persons with mental disabilities
deserved something more than rational basis review and found the
law at issue discriminatory.'18 In establishing persons with a
172. Lav, supra note 159, at 210; see supra note 162 and accompanying text for
the definition of a qualified individual with a disability.
173. 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(7) (2003); see also supra note 167 and accompanying
text.
174. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF
1990, H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (IIl), at 49-50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, at 473.
175. Lav, supra note 159, at 211-12.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
177. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2003).
179. Id.
180. 473 U.S. 432 (1985); L.R.A., supra note 58, at 1028-29.
181. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432.
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disability as a protected class, states are thus required to show a
compelling governmental interest before discriminatory policies
may be upheld in court. 8 2
C. Disability Jurisprudence in Law Enforcement Since the
ADA
Courts have been hesitant to acknowledge Congress'
intentions for systemic change and the elimination of barriers in
the area of law enforcement. Courts have generally found that the
ADA applied to arrest, post-arrest, and pretrial situations.18 3 They
have, however, generally limited violations to situations of clear
discrimination, rather than, for example, arrests for criminal
offenses that were manifestations of the mental illness. Courts'
decisions in arrest, post-arrest, and pretrial cases can be divided
into three categories: (1) wrongful arrest cases, in which the
person is arrested due to a disability; 84 (2) "exigent circumstance"
cases, in which the court finds that the person with the mental
disability denied herself the benefits of police protection through
her own criminal acts; 8 5 and (3) post-arrest and pretrial cases,
involving police treatment of the disabled during transport to the
police station and interrogation. 8 6
1. Wrongful Arrest Cases
In wrongful arrest cases, the courts have found the ADA
182. L.R.A., supra note 58, at 1029-30.
183. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446. At least two cases do not fall into this
general framework; their logic, however, has either been rejected by the Supreme
Court or not followed by the other courts. See Patrice v. Murphy, 43 F. Supp. 2d
1156 (W.D. Wash. 1999). A deaf plaintiff alleged that the police had discriminated
against her because the officer failed to make a reasonable accommodation of her
disability by not providing her with an interpreter in order to allow her to benefit
from police services. Id. Although the court acknowledged the application of the
ADA to a wrongful arrest situation, it held that an arrest was not an activity or
service from which a plaintiff could be excluded from or denied the benefits of due
to their stressful and sometimes dangerous circumstances. Id. at 1160. While the
outcome is similar to that of the reasonable accommodation cases, its logic is
anomalous. See also Rosen v. Montgomery County, 121 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 1997).
In Rosen dicta, the court said that the ADA does not apply to arrest situations
because it is not a program or activity of the County because it is not voluntary. Id.
at 157. The argument relied on the district court decision in Gorman v. Bartch, 925
F. Supp. 653, 655 (W.D. Mo. 1996), which was reversed by the Eighth Circuit. 152
F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998). In Yeskey, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
to be eligible for the activity or service, an arrest must be voluntary. 524 U.S. 206,
211 (1998).
184. See infra Part II.C.1.
185. See infra Part II.C.2.
186. See infra Part II.C.3.
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applicable when subjects were arrested due to manifestations of
their disabilities that were not, in themselves, crimes. In Lewis v.
Truitt,18 7 the court found that there was potential discrimination
under the ADA where the deaf defendant alleged that the police
arrested him because he could not understand what they were
saying and did not properly respond to their requests.188 In
Jackson v. Sanford,189 the district court held that the ADA applied
to a case involving a defendant who, as a result of a stroke, had
physical difficulties that were confused with intoxication and
resulted in an arrest for driving under the influence.190
Congress specifically discussed the type of discrimination
occurring in the wrongful arrest cases as the type of discrimination
against which the ADA was meant to protect.1 91 In particular, the
House Judiciary Committee stated that people with epilepsy and
other disabilities "are frequently inappropriately arrested and
jailed because police officers have not received proper training in
the recognition of and aid of seizures." 192  The Judiciary
Committee felt that this kind of discriminatory treatment of
persons with disabilities could be avoided with proper training. 193
2. Exigent Circumstances Cases
Other courts agree that, although the ADA applies to
wrongful arrest situations, it does not apply when the petitioner's
actions create an exigent circumstance that prevents her from
receiving the benefit of police protection or medical treatment. 194
For example, in Hainze v. Richards,195 the police responded to a
call of a family member asking them to transport the petitioner,
who had a mental illness and was under the influence of alcohol
and antidepressants, to the hospital for mental health
treatment.196 The police had been notified that the petitioner had
187. 960 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
188. Id. at 178-79.
189. 3 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1366 (D. Me. 1994).
190. Id. at 1371.
191. House Comm. on the Judiciary, Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,
H.R. Rep. No. 485 (III), at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 473.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2000); Thompson v.
Williamson County, 219 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2000); Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216
(10th Cir. 1999); McKlemurry v. Hendrix, 971 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
195. 207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2000).
196. Id. at 797.
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been threatening to commit "suicide by cop."'197 On arrival, the
police pointed their guns at him.198 The petitioner began walking
toward them with a knife and when he did not stop after a police
order, the officer shot him. 199 The petitioner survived and was
convicted of aggravated assault.200 The Fifth Circuit held that the
officers did not deny the petitioner the benefits and protections of
the county's mental health training, but rather his own illegal
actions denied him that benefit.20 1 The court also held that "Title
II does not apply to an officer's on the street responses to reported
disturbances ... prior to the officer's securing the scene and
ensuring that there is no threat to human life." 202 However, the
court also explained that once public safety was no longer an issue,
the "deputies would have been under a duty to reasonably
accommodate [the petitioner's] disability in handling and
transporting him to a mental health facility."203
In Thompson v. Williamson County,20 4 the petitioner's
brother called 911 because the petitioner had a mental illness and
threatened their father with a machete. 205 After responding the
first time and failing to find the petitioner, the officers responded
again after the petitioner's brother called for help and his mother
agreed to sign an arrest warrant. 206 When the officer arrived, the
petitioner moved toward the officer with two machetes. 20 7 The
officer ordered him to drop then, which the petitioner did not do, so
the officer shot and killed him. 208 The court held that "if the
decedent was denied access to medical services, it was because of
his violent, threatening behavior, not because he was mentally
disabled" and, therefore, there was no ADA claim. 20 9
In Gohier v. Enright,21 0 the Tenth Circuit held somewhat
differently than the other exigent circumstances cases. It found





201. Id. at 801.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 802
204. 219 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2000).




209. Id. at 558.
210. 186 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 1999).
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acknowledged the possibility of a claim based on the need for
officers to "reasonably accommodate" the offender's mental
illness.211 In Gohier, the officer stopped the decedent, who was
walking down the street, in response to reports of a man hitting
vehicles with a baseball bat and pipe, even though decedent did
not fit the description. 212 The officer identified himself and asked
the decedent to talk to him. 213 The decedent started walking
toward the officer with his hand behind his back and a "crazed"
look on his face.214 The officer shouted for him to show his hands,
and when he did, the officer thought he had a knife in his hands.215
The officer decided the decedent had a mental illness and
retreated behind his car. 21 6 However, the decedent kept moving
toward him and acted as if he were going to steal the police car.217
When the officer moved to stop him, he thought the decedent was
about to stab him, and he shot and killed decedent. 218 The Tenth
Circuit held that arrests are not excluded from the scope of Title II
and found that the decedent's unlawful conduct was the result of
his disability.219 Nonetheless, the court held that the decedent's
threatening behavior warranted the police response of self-
defense. 220 The court clarified, however, that there may have been
a valid claim that Colorado Springs should "better train its police
officers to recognize reported disturbances that are likely to
involve persons with mental disabilities, and to investigate and
arrest such persons in a manner reasonably accommodating their
disability."22 1
3. Post-Arrest and Pretrial Cases
Courts have also found that services following arrest and
during pretrial detention and investigation are subject to the
requirements of the ADA. For example, in Gorman v. Barch,222
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1217.






219. Id. at 1221.
220. Id. at 1222.
221. Id.
222. 152 F.3d 907, 907 (8th Cir. 1998). Gorman was a paraplegic who was
arrested and transported to the police station in a van with no special equipment to
secure the wheelchair. Id. at 909-10. Furthermore, he claimed that he was denied
the opportunity to empty his urine bag before leaving. Id. at 909. In order to
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the Eighth Circuit applied the reasoning of Yeskey to hold that
transporting an arrestee to a police station is a service subject to
the protections of the ADA.223 In its analysis, the Eighth Circuit
found that a local police department falls within the statutory
definition of "public entity" and that to be a qualified individual,
participation need not be voluntary.
224
The U.S. District Court for New Jersey similarly held in
Calloway v. Glassboro Department of Police225 that the reasoning
of Yeskey applied to station-house investigative questioning.
226
The court found that station-house investigative questioning
qualifies as an activity under the ADA and, therefore, a qualified
person with a disability cannot be excluded from participation in
or denied the benefits of the activity in an "appropriate
manner."227  In Calloway, this holding meant that a deaf
individual may need the assistance of a qualified interpreter "to
provide information to the police concerning the commission of
crimes, whether in a witness or a suspect capacity."
228
One court also recognized exigent circumstances precluding
the application of the ADA in pretrial detention situations. In
McKlemurry v. Hendrix,229 the petitioner had a long history of
mental illness and was arrested for possession of alcohol, a
violation of his probation. 230 Although his family sought to have
him civilly committed, the court found that it could not do so as
long as criminal charges were outstanding. 231 The court held that
although the petitioner's mental disability may have contributed
to his probation violation, because the denial of a mental
evaluation and civil commitment was based upon a valid criminal
charge and not on the basis of the disability, there was no viable
ADA claim.232
All of these courts, therefore, have established that when an
officer is attempting to arrest, or is arresting, investigating,
transport him, the police tied his upper body to the wire mesh behind the bench.
Id. at 910. On the drive to the station, the tie broke causing Gorman to fall to the
floor injuring his back and shoulders as well as causing his urine bag to break,
soaking him with urine. Id. The unsecured wheelchair also sustained damage. Id.
223. Id. at 912.
224. Id.
225. 89 F. Supp. 2d 543 (D. N.J. 2000).
226. Id. at 555.
227. Id. at 555-56.
228. Id. at 556.
229. 971 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
230. Id. at 1090.
231. Id. at 1092.
232. Id. at 1096.
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transporting or detaining a person, both the activity and the
person with a mental illness who is the focus of the police activity
are subject to the protections of the ADA. These holdings could
logically be extended to cover cases of mercy arrests and other
arrests where no actual crime was committed, but where the
person with the mental disability was arrested solely because of
her disability. The courts have generally found, however, that in
arrest and pretrial situations, when there are exigent
circumstances caused by the person with the mental disability, it
is those circumstances that prevent the person from receiving
police protection or medical treatment, not discrimination by the
officer. Where an exigent circumstance is found, the courts have
held that there is no ADA violation.
D. Olmstead v. L.C.: Unjustified Institutionalization and
Segregation Are Discriminatory
Contrary to the exigent circumstances cases, the Supreme
Court in Olmstead v. L.C.233 held that discrimination does not only
arise when one is overtly discriminated against because of one's
disability. Instead, the plurality held that "unjustified
institutional isolation" and "unjustified segregation" of persons
with disabilities are also forms of discrimination based on
disability and are prohibited by the ADA.234 In reaching this
holding, the Court relied on language in the Attorney General's
regulations implementing the provisions of Title II that services,
programs, and activities must be administered in the "most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals
with disabilities. '235
In Olmstead, the Court applied Title II to two patients in a
mental health institution who were approved for a community-
based program, but who remained confined to a psychiatric unit
because of inadequate funding.23 6 The state argued that the
respondents were not denied community placement because of
their disabilities, but rather because the facilities necessary for
their transfer were unavailable, and the denial was not, therefore,
discriminatory. 237 This is similar to the holdings of the exigent
circumstances cases, but here the state was arguing that the
exigent circumstance was insufficient community treatment
233. 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (plurality).
234. Id. at 598, 600.
235. Id. at 592 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998)).
236. Id. at 593.
237. Id. at 598.
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facilities, whereas in the exigent circumstance cases, the exigency
was the alleged criminal act of the defendant.238 Unlike the
exigent circumstances cases, however, the majority held that when
an individual has a mental illness and is not provided with
community-based treatment deemed appropriate by the state's
own professionals, such lack of treatment is unjustified
segregation and therefore discriminatory and a violation of the
ADA. 239
The Court in Olmstead gave two reasons why unjustified
institutionalization and segregation are discriminatory.240 The
first is that "institutional placement of persons who can handle
and benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted
assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of
participating in community life."241  The second is that
"confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday
life activities of individuals .. .."242 As a result, the Court found
that discrimination existed because "[i]n order to receive needed
medical services, persons with mental disabilities must, because of
those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life they
could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons
without mental disabilities can receive the medical services they
need without similar sacrifice." 243
III. Using the ADA to Reduce the Criminalization of
Persons with a Mental Illness from the Arrest and
Pretrial Processes
Courts have clearly supported the application of the ADA in
cases of wrongful arrests, in the provision of police services
following arrests, and in pretrial detention. 244 In cases where
crimes have been alleged, however, courts have been unwilling to
find ADA violations, even when it was clear that the act was a
manifestation of the mental illness. 245 The courts make this
distinction by focusing only on the behavior of the individual at the
time of the arrest and the police response to that behavior. 246 This
238. See supra Part II.C.2.
239. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 598-603.
240. Id. at 600.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 601.
243. Id. at 600-01.
244. See supra Parts II.C.1, 3.
245. See supra Part II.C.2.
246. Id; see, e.g., Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding
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logic, however, ignores the fact that the criminal behavior is
caused by the mental illness and may have been preventable had
there been appropriate systems available. 247  An alternative
approach that conforms to the Supreme Court's decision in
Olmstead is that discussed by the Tenth Circuit in Gohier v.
Enright.248 Gohier raised the possibility that the ADA violation
may occur earlier than the act itself-for example, the violation
may be in not providing reasonable accommodations for the
mental illness, such as failing to provide sufficient training for the
police or adequate mental health care. 249
A. Proper Analysis of Exigent Circumstances Cases Under
Olmstead
The exigent circumstances cases in the lower courts have
been decided incorrectly. California's former first lady, Sharon
Davis, compared the treating of persons with a mental illness in
jail after they committed an offense to treating the sick only when
they go to an emergency room. 250 To argue that the unjustified
institutionalization analysis is different because a crime was
committed and because the institution is a jail misses the point.
Persons with a mental illness who are arrested due to
manifestations of their illness and put in jail may be
"relinquish[ing] participation in community life [that] they could
an exigent circumstance when the person with the mental illness walked toward
the officer with a knife and did not stop when ordered); Thompson v. Williamson
County, 219 F.3d 555, 556 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding an exigent circumstance when
the person with the mental illness came at the officer with a machete); Gohier v.
Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding an exigent circumstance
when the defendant acted as if he were going to stab the officer); McKlemurry v.
Hendrix, 971 F. Supp. 1089, 1096 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (finding an exigent
circumstance was the possession of alcohol, a probation violation).
247. Only one court has acknowledged that the unlawful act was a result of the
person's disability in terms of the ADA. See Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221.
248. Id.
249. Id. There may be situations where the available resources do not help a
violent offender with a mental illness and the police may have no other recourse
but to defend themselves. That said, there should be more systems in place to
ensure that the individual with a mental illness does not arrive at the situation
where she or he becomes violent in the first place. Moreover, there should be
training to ensure that the actions of police are not aggravating an already difficult
situation. The court, when determining if an ADA violation has taken place,
should be examining what was in place to prevent these situations from occurring.
There is already evidence that this kind of community treatment and police
training can alleviate difficult situations. See infra notes 272, 278 and
accompanying text.
250. Marquis, supra note 39, at B8.
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[have] enjoy[ed] given reasonable accommodations ... ."251 For
example, it has been shown that having appropriate community
services available to persons with a mental illness will result in
their committing fewer crimes. 252 This result may stem from
reduced drug and alcohol dependency, reduced homelessness, and
better mental health treatment. 2 3  These "reasonable
modifications" could thus significantly diminish the
criminalization of persons with a mental illness.
254
Without these kinds of services, however, many, if not most
of these people are being jailed for preventable manifestations of
their mental illness rather than criminal intent. 255 There is no
difference between this kind of institutionalization and
segregation and the kind that was unjustifiable in Olmstead; the
harms in both cases are due in large part to a failure to provide
"reasonable accommodations." 256 Because the institutionalization
and segregation derive from manifestations of the individual's
mental illness, they are unjustified and discriminatory and,
therefore, a violation of the ADA.257
Moreover, based on Congress' expressed intent to create
systemic change and to provide protected class status for persons
with disabilities, making improvements to mental health care and
police training, and creating diversion programs should be viewed
as removing barriers that prevent the full participation of persons
with a mental illness in society.258 Congress itself spoke about the
need to provide training to public employees, particularly officers,
about disability to prevent inappropriate arrests based on acts
resulting from the disability.259  Without these "reasonable
modifications,"260 persons with a mental illness continue to be
251. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601; see supra note 243 and accompanying text.
252. See PERLIN, supra note 27, at 73 ("[Tlhere is an ample body of evidence
indicating that a well-conceived deinstitutionalization program with a variety of
rehabilitative services offered intensively has a positive and significant effect on
the length of the ex-patients' 'tenure' in the community."); Lamb & Weinberger,
supra note 25, at 489 ("[I]t has been found that court-mandated and -monitored
treatment in lieu of jail was effective in obtaining a good outcome for chronically
and severely mentally ill persons who committed misdemeanors."); see also infra
Part III.B.
253. See supra note 252 and accompanying text; supra Part I.B.1-2, infra Part
III.B.
254. See supra note 167 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B.
255. See supra Part I.
256. See supra note 243 and accompanying text; supra Part I.
257. See supra Parts I, I.D.
258. See supra Part I.B.
259. See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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unjustifiably segregated and institutionalized and therefore
discriminated against in violation of the ADA.261
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), funded by the U.S.
Department of Justice, has recognized Congress' mandate and the
resulting responsibility of law enforcement "to distinguish criminal
behavior from conduct that is the product of mental illness but has
no criminal intent."262 The NIJ has stated that a "failure to work
with mental health authorities to ensure the appropriate response
to 'nuisance' offenders," by making the distinction between
criminal conduct resulting from a mental illness and criminal
conduct resulting from criminal intent, may violate the ADA.263
This is just one example of reasonable modifications that must
take place in order to eliminate the criminalization of persons with
a mental illness and to satisfy the mandate of the ADA.
The proper test then, after looking at the ADA and Olmstead
should be, first, to examine if the mental health treatment
alternatives and law enforcement activities are structured in such
a way that persons with a mental illness are discriminated against
based upon a manifestation of their disability.264  If such
discrimination exists, then the courts should look to see if the
structure is inherently required, or if it stems from a failure to
make reasonable modifications in these areas that would prevent
the discrimination from occurring. 265 If a court finds that there
has been a failure to make reasonable modifications to the existing
structures, then the courts should find that there has been a
violation of the ADA. 266
B. Reasonable Modifications to Reduce the Criminalization
of Persons with Mental Illness
In order to remedy the criminalization of persons with a
mental illness, the ADA requires that public entities make
reasonable modifications unless the public entity can demonstrate
that making the modification would result in a "fundamental
alteration."267 Advocates have proposed a variety of reasonable
261. See supra Part II.D.
262. PAULA N. RUBIN & SUSAN W. MCCAMPBELL, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: MENTAL
DISABILITIES AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 2 (1995), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/ amdisact.txt (last visited Oct. 8, 2004).
263. Id.
264. See Lav, supra note 159, at 227.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 23:157
ADA: CORRECTING DISCRIMINATION
modifications. One recommendation is to improve access to
community mental health services, including the provision of
outreach teams, supportive housing, case management programs,
and other programs. 268  Supportive housing, for example,
addresses many of the factors that have led to the criminalization
of persons with a mental illness by providing a place to live with
on-site mental health services including case management,
psychiatry, medication management, and counseling, which is
much less expensive than incarceration. 269 These kinds of services
have been shown to reduce arrests of persons with a mental
illness. 270
Other recommendations involve the combined efforts of both
the mental health and the criminal justice systems, such as the
development of crisis response teams and jail diversion
programs. 271 Some communities have already established mobile
crisis teams to respond to calls concerning persons with a mental
illness. 272 Studies of these programs have shown arrest rates
ranging 2-13% (with an average of 7%) contrasting with a 21%
arrest rate for non-specialized officers in contact with persons who
had an apparent mental illness. 273
Still other recommendations involve the criminal justice
system alone. One such recommendation is to repeal the laws that
permit jails to be used for emergency detention of persons with
mental illness not charged with a crime. 274  Other
268. See BARR, supra note 11, at v; NAMI REPORT, supra note 41, at 97-102;
Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 25, at 489-90.
269. BARR, supra note 11, at 11. Supportive housing for an individual in New
York City costs about $33 per day compared to a cost of jail incarceration at $175
per day or prison incarceration at $88 per day. Id. at 8-11.
270. See Clark et al., supra note 65, at 647.
271. See BARR, supra note 11, at v; NAMI REPORT, supra note 41, at 97-102;
Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 25, at 489-90.
272. See Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 25, at 489-90. Different strategies have
been developed around the country to provide mobile teams of police, mental health
professionals, or both to respond to crises involving persons with a mental illness.
Id. Some communities achieve this by providing special mental health training to
sworn police officers who act as liaisons with the mental health system. Id. This
model also emphasizes psychiatric emergency services with a no-refusal policy for
persons brought to them by police. Id. These officers can act both on-site during
emergency situations and as consultants to other officers at the scene. Id. Another
method is for police departments to hire mental health consultants who provide on-
site and telephone consultations to officers in the field. Id. Similarly, some
jurisdictions have arrangements with the local community mental health service
system to respond to special needs incidents. Id. Finally, some jurisdictions deploy
teams of officers and mental health professions to resolve emergency situations. Id.
273. See Lamb et al., supra note 80, at 1268.
274. NAMI REPORT, supra note 41, at 97.
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recommendations focus on the provision of mental health services
during the detention of a person with a mental illness.2 7 5 These
include ensuring that a mental health professional evaluates an
arrested person with a mental illness within twenty-four hours of
admission to a jail, and providing ongoing psychiatric services,
including medications, on a timely basis for persons incarcerated
within a jail.27 6 Another recommendation is to provide sufficient
training on serious mental illnesses to police officers and
corrections officers when they are hired and through continuing
education. 277  An additional recommendation is to develop
alternatives to incarceration programs for people with a mental
illness. 27 8
States would probably argue that these recommendations
would create a fundamental alteration of services. 279 However, the
fundamental alteration occurred following the
deinstitutionalization of persons with a mental illness. Not only
were these persons released to communities that did not have a
mental health system ready to accommodate them, but also the
police were forced to deal with an increasing number of mental
illness-related incidents without having proper training.280 A
better community mental health treatment system should already
exist. Furthermore, policies and training should be in place to
ensure that law enforcement is as concerned with protecting
persons with a mental illness, even from themselves, as it is with
those who do not have a mental illness.
Nonetheless, states would likely argue that they do not have
the resources to make the "reasonable modifications" necessary to
eliminate the criminalization of persons with a mental illness.
28 1
Congress noted, however, "[w]hile the integration of people with
disabilities will sometimes involve substantial short-term burdens,
both financial and administrative, the long-range effects of
integration will benefit society as a whole."28 2 In addition, based
on initial studies, making the suggested recommendations would
275. Id. at 97-100.
276. Id. at 98.
277. Id. at 100.
278. See BARR, supra note 11, at v; NAMI REPORT, supra note 41, at 97-102;
Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 25, at 489-90.
279. See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
280. See supra Part I.
281. See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
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ultimately reduce costs rather than increase them, as the
revolving door between mental health institutions and jails is
costly, both to persons with a serious mental illness and to
society.28 3 For example, a study in New Hampshire of individuals
with a serious mental illness showed that providing stable,
supervised housing and effective treatment of co-occurring
substance abuse reduced legal costs, arrests, and incarcerations. 28
4
In New York City in 1999, to incarcerate an individual in jail
cost approximately $175 per day and in prison it cost
approximately $88 per day.28 5  However, in considering the
potential cost savings of diversion, one must look not only at the
costs of incarceration, but the costs of physical and mental health
care provided while the person with a mental illness is
incarcerated. 28 6 For example, New York City spent over $115
million per year for physical and mental health services for jail
inmates. 28 7 In comparison to the cost of incarceration, supportive
housing, which includes mental health services, cost New York
City only $33 per day-a significant savings over incarceration. 28 8
Other costs and savings must be examined as well. Diversion
out of the criminal justice system at an early stage saves both the
cost of incarceration and many of the processing costs. 2 9 Halting
the revolving door would create a huge potential for reducing the
direct costs of crime, such as costs from injury to victims and
property damage. 290 Beyond the direct savings, there are many
more societal benefits: reduced jail overcrowding, resulting in
space for serious criminals; reduced police time responding to calls
involving someone with a mental illness, allowing the police to
focus more appropriately on their job of law enforcement; reduced
crime due to fewer untreated persons with a serious mental
illness; and, most importantly, increased numbers of productive
283. See BARR, supra note 11, at 8, 10; NAMI REPORT, supra note 41, at 44.
284. Clark et al., supra note 65, at 647.
285. BARR, supra note 11, at 8-9.
286. Id. at 9.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 11.
289. Id. at 10-11. The processing costs include the costs for:
the police who arrest and process the person; the court pens where the
person is held; the defense attorney ... ; the Assistant District Attorney...
; the judges ... their staff and court officers; the rent, maintenance and
overhead of the courthouse; the jail where the person is detained;
transportation to and from the jail, et cetera.
Id. at 9.





Chuck, with his history of drug abuse, James, as a homeless
person, and Risdon, in his failure to take his medications, all faced
problems similar to many other persons with mental disabilities in
their dealings with the criminal justice system.292  The
criminalization of persons with a mental illness has been
increasing since deinstitutionalization in the 1960s and 1970s.293
The primary reason for this is a lack of community treatment
alternatives to address their mental health care needs as well as
other problems faced by persons with a mental illness, such as
drug and alcohol abuse and homelessness. 294 Contributing to
these problems is the fact that persons with a mental illness are
often arrested either for no crime at all, or for manifestations of
their mental illnesses. 295 The police, on the other hand, face a
variety of barriers to providing an effective response, including a
lack of training and public misconceptions of mental illness.296
The ADA is one means to eliminate some of the systemic
barriers to ending the criminalization of persons with a mental
illness.297 In passing the ADA, Congress expressed a desire to
eliminate the barriers faced by persons with a disability that
prevent their full participation in society.298 Unfortunately, while
courts have found the ADA applicable to cases involving wrongful
arrests made clearly because of the disability, they have applied
an exigent circumstances exception when an alleged criminal
offense was committed, even when it was a manifestation of the
291. NAMI REPORT, supra note 41, at 56-57; see also Clark, supra note 65, at 647
(discussing the reduced costs and societal benefits of diverting treatment of the
mentally ill away from the criminal system); PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM
COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 61, at 4. Dorothy P. Rice and L.
Stephen Miller estimate that the annual indirect cost of mental illness to the
United States is $79 billion. PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION ON MENTAL
HEALTH, supra note 61, at 3 (citing Dorothy P. Rice & L. Stephen Miller, The
Economic Burden of Schizophrenia: Conceptual and Methodological Issues and Cost
Estimates, in SCHIZOPHRENIA 321-34 (M. Moscarelli et al. eds., 1996)). They
further estimate that almost $4 billion is lost annually in productivity for
individuals who are incarcerated and who must provide family care. Id.
292. See supra Introduction.
293. See supra Part I.A.
294. See supra Part I.B.1, 2.
295. See supra Part I.B.3.
296. See supra Part I.B.4, 5.
297. See supra Part II.A, B.
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mental disability. 299 This analysis ignores both Congress' desire
for systemic change and the Supreme Court's holding in Olmstead,
where the plurality held that continued detention due to the
failure to provide appropriate treatment alternatives resulted in
unjustified segregation and institutionalization. 300
A lack of community-based treatment alternatives and law
enforcement's inability to appropriately respond to persons with a
mental illness through appropriate policies and programs result in
the unjustified institutionalization of persons with a mental illness
in jails and prisons, and too often result in their deaths.30 1 The
current failure in both of these areas has resulted in the
criminalization of persons with a mental illness and is, therefore,
discriminatory, and a violation of the ADA.30 2 This violation calls
for reasonable modifications to be made to remedy the
discrimination and to remove the barriers to equality that are
faced by people such as Chuck, James, and Risdon. 30 3
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